Report released into fatal Powys train collision

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Report released into fatal Powys train collision

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Picture of Michael Holden

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Talerddig collision
Talerddig collision // Credit: RAIB

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch has released its report into the train collision at Talerddig in 2024.

The two trains were operated by Transport for Wales, which were 1J25 18:31 Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth, and 1S71, the 19:09 Machynlleth to Shrewsbury service.

This collision took place near Talerddig loop in Powys on the Cambrian Line.

1J25 was approaching the loop at Talerddig with the intention of stopping to allow 1S71 to pass.

However, 1J25 did not stop in the loop, and the train continued on through the point and collided with 1S71.

1J25 was travelling at around 24mph when the collision happened, and 1S71 was travelling at around 6mph in the opposite direction.

Sadly, one person on 1J25 suffered fatal injuries due to the collision and three people suffered serious injuries, including the guard.

The driver of 1S71 suffered serious injuries, and the five people on board suffered minor injuries.

Talerddig Collision Laser Scan Image
Talerddig Collision Laser Scan Image // Credit: RAIB

The report has found that 1J25 passed its stopping position in the loop due to three factors:

  • Wheel-rail adhesion in the area was low, but not exceptionally low for the area during October
  • The sanders on 1J25 did not dispense sand. The RAIB found that the automatic sander did not function, possibly due to electrical faults in the control circuit. A manually operated emergency sander was not operated by the driver.
  • The approach speed of 1J25 towards the eastern end of Talerddig loop was enough that the deceleration needed to slow the train in the loop could not be sustained with the available adhesion on the rail.

Having passed through Talerddig loop. 1J25 entered the steep downhill gradient, and this area had exceptionally low adhesion, which meant that although the train’s brakes were applied, the train did not slow down as it approached 1S71.

The RAIB also found that there were no engineered mitigations to prevent the trian entering the single line in the event of an overrun.

Talerddig collision
Talerddig collision // Credit: RAIB

The RAIB has made nine recommendations in its report:

  • Two recommendations have been made to both the Rail Safety and Standards Board and Angel Trains to improve the design and maintenance of its sanding equipment.
  • Network Rail has been recommended to review its assumptions to justify the use of simple assessments of overrun risks on the Cambrian Line.
  • Network Rail has also been recommended to improve the overrun protection of its software and also review how overrun risks are assessed.
  • Network Rail should improve its railhead treatment regimes, building on the recommendations made in the report into the Salisbury crash.
  • Two recommendations are made to TfWRL to ask it to review how drivers are trained, based on issues identified in this investigation.
  • A recommendation is made to the Rail Safety and Standards Board to review standards and rules governing the design of passenger train interior fittings to reduce the risk to passengers in the event of an accident.
  • A recommendation made to TfWRL intends that all on-train staff, irrespective of role, have the skills and knowledge required to assist in the event of an emergency.

The RAIB also identified a learning point relating to reaching a clear understanding when safety‑critical communications take place between signallers and train drivers.

“Safety remains our highest priority for both our customers and colleagues.

 “Our thoughts continue to be with the family and loved ones of David Tudor Evans and those passengers injured in the incident, and we continue to support our colleagues who were injured or affected.

 “Network Rail and Transport for Wales welcome the publication of the Rail Accident Investigation Branch’s final report into this incident and have cooperated fully with the investigation throughout.

 “While incidents of this nature are extremely rare on our rail network, we remain committed to working together as an industry to carefully consider the report’s recommendations to help prevent a similar incident in the future.”

Joint statement from Transport for Wales & Network Rail

“RAIB has made nine recommendations to reduce both the likelihood and mitigate the consequences of a similar event. I sincerely hope the lessons of this accident deliver lasting safety improvements on the Cambrian line, across the ongoing rollout of ERTMS, and on the wider railway network.”

“The accident at Talerddig was a tragedy. One person lost their life and others were seriously injured in the first fatal train-to-train collision in more than 25 years.

“Widely varying levels of grip between steel wheels and steel rails is an inherent issue for railways and a lot of effort goes into managing this and its possible consequences. That can involve the way track and the surrounding area is maintained, the way trains and signalling systems are designed, and the way trains are operated and maintained. The Talerddig investigation found factors associated with several of these areas, and related to the way different parts of the overall railway system interacted.

Andrew Hall, Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents

Responses

  1. “… no engineered mitigations to prevent the trian entering the single line in the event of an overrun…”
    Time was when the track layout would not have permitted 1J25 to stay on the main route with the signals against it. Now, admittedly dumping 1J25 onto the ballast at 24 mph is not ideal but neither is a head on collision. I can’t help thinking that the removal of trap points etc has been cash driven and would question the risk assessment that permitted it

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