Following its update last year, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) has released its report on the near-miss incident at Millbrook, Bedfordshire, in September 2025.

The report’s conclusion stresses that it is important that workers only go on or near the line when they are accompanied by a controller of site safety who has given them permission. It also emphasises that all staff involved must reach a clear understanding when discussing safety-critical information, and that it is essential to challenge unsafe working practices in line with recognised rail industry systems.

On 25 September 2025, at around 26 minutes before midnight, a passenger train that was travelling at 108 mph (174 km/h) on the Midland Main Line nearly hit a van. Railway workers had reversed the van onto the track at an access point near Millbrook, just north of Ampthill tunnels. No injuries or damage resulted from the incident.

At this location, the track has four lines running north to south, with two Up lines carrying southbound trains towards London, and two Down lines carrying northbound trains towards Bedford and Leicester.

The railway workers intended to work on the slow lines – both the Up and the Down lines. These lines were already blocked to rail traffic in preparation for the work. However, the workers accessed the railway adjacent to the Fast lines instead. There were still trains running on these lines.

The van was driven onto the wrong side of the railway, across the Down Fast line, with its rear close to the Up Fast line on which the train was travelling.

There were ten workers in the track work team, including a person in charge (PIC), who was also the designated controller of site safety (COSS) for the team. They were working a series of night shifts, fixing discrete track defects by lifting the track and packing ballast under the sleepers.

Before they accessed the track, the PIC briefed the workers on the planned work for that night and on the contents of the safe work pack (SWP). However, the SWP showed the wrong access point. The PIC noticed and corrected this.

The PIC was also due to place marker boards at the limits of the work site, but was not present when the rest of the team arrived at the access. The site warden drove the van to bridge 169, and was followed by contractor staff in other vehicles. The site warden opened the access gate on the fast line side of the track and reversed the van into the yard. When the PIC phoned to advise that the marker boards were in place, the van was driven onto the track

The van was stationary on the road-rail access point (RRAP, with its rear close to where the train would pass. Unaware of the van’s presence, the train driver did not sound the train’s horn as it approached.

Thus, the incident was caused by confusion about which access point to use, as this was communicated by telephone rather than the PIC / COSS being present as required by Network Rail standards.

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