RAIB issues safety digest into near miss in Lincolnshire

Picture of Roger Smith

Share:

RAIB issues safety digest into near miss in Lincolnshire

Share:

Picture of Roger Smith

Share:

Helpston level crossing with Helpston signal box on the right.
Helpston level crossing with Helpston signal box on the right. // Credit: RAIB

The Railway Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) has issued a safety digest into a near miss at a manually-controlled barrier level crossing at Helpston in Lincolnshire.

The incident occurred on 21st October 2025 whilst the signaller was being observed by a local operations manager during a routine visit to the signal box. Recorded data shows that the signaller started to lower the crossing barriers at 08:12:29 in readiness for three approaching trains: a passenger train on the Down Fast line, a second passenger train on the Up Fast line, and a freight train on the Up Stamford line.

Layout of Helpston level crossing. // Credit: RAIB
Layout of Helpston level crossing. // Credit: RAIB

The barriers were recorded as being fully down at 08:13:04, and the crossing was declared clear at 08:13:10. The passenger train on the Down Fast line passed the crossing just over 2 minutes later, followed 40 seconds later by the second passenger train on the Up Fast line.

Data records show the barrier controls were set to manual mode seven seconds before the second train passed over the crossing, and whilst the freight train was approaching the crossing. Witness evidence states that the signaller tried to raise the barriers manually about 11 seconds after the passage of the second passenger train.

The signaller looked out of the crossing windows towards the Up and Down Fast and Slow lines, but did not look towards the Stamford lines. The signaller tried unsuccessfully to raise the barriers, but signal interlocking had detected the freight train and prevented them from being raised.

Barrier release box. // Credit: RAIB
Barrier release box. // Credit: RAIB

The signaller had forgotten that the freight train was approaching, and because of recent experience of barrier failure at this level crossing, they assumed there was a fault with the barriers, because of an equipment failure. To overcome this, the signaller operated a release plunger to raise the barriers.

The plunger should have been covered by a paper seal, but the seal was already broken and had been left inside the plunger access hole after an incident on 4th July 2025; the broken seal had been logged by the duty signaller on duty, but had not been reported for repair.

A preliminary examination by the RAIB found that at Helpston signal box, the sealed release was routinely used to raise the barriers whilst engineering work took place near the crossing. The alternative option was to manually raise and lower each barrier individually, but that would not activate the road traffic lights or audible alarms.

View of the Stamford lines from Helpston signal box. // Credit: RAIB
View of the Stamford lines from Helpston signal box. // Credit: RAIB

This practice was not documented in the Helpston signal box, nor were managers aware of its use. Furthermore, although the signaller had been trained in the use of the sealed release during possessions, they did not clearly understand when it should be used, or the associated Rule Book requirements.

The General Signalling Regulations in force at the time of the incident provide detailed instructions on how and when a sealed release may be used.

Other incidents investigated by the RAIB recently include a train derailment in Darlington and a train travelling at excessive speed over a junction in Hertfordshire.

Responses

Related Articles

Upcoming Events