Microsleep and fatigue caused London Bridge train incident

Picture of Michael Holden

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Microsleep and fatigue caused London Bridge train incident

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Picture of Michael Holden

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The train and buffer stops (shown on the left of the picture) after the collision
The train and buffer stops (shown on the left of the picture) after the collision // Credit: RAIB

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch has released its report after a train hit the buffer stops at London Bridge in December 2024.

At around 15:45, on the 13th December 2024, a Southern train hit the buffers on platform 12 at London Bridge.

The collision took place at around 2.3mph, but thankfully, there were no injuries to anyone on board. There was minor damage to the train and infrastructure.

The RAIB says that the train was travelling at 13.3mph when it entered the platform, and this gradually decreased as it approached the buffers.

The train was around 3.5 metres away from the buffer stop when the driver made an emergency brake application. Despite this, the train couldn’t stop in time.

The investigation found that the accident happened because the driver didn’t apply the brakes in time on approach, which the RAIB says is ‘almost certainly’ because the driver had a microsleep, due to fatigue.

The RAIB says that two factors in the fatigue were that the base roster was constructed in a way that may have contributed to fatigue. Additionally, the driver had worked many of their rostered rest days in a period up to the accident.

The driver also had less than their normal amount of sleep the night before the accident.

None of the protection systems was activated prior to the collision. TPWS was fitted, but didn’t apply as the train was travelling below the intervention speed that is set.

The RAIB says that the management of fatigue by Govia Thameslink Railway was not effective and it had not adopted some of the good practices in the industry for fatigue management.

RAIB has made two recommendations as a result of this investigation, one addressed to Govia Thameslink Railway to improve its fatigue management process and to follow industry best practice.

The other is addressed to the Rail Safety and Standards Board, in consultation with the rail industry, to provide guidance when seeking external advice about medical conditions and working hours that may increase the risk of fatigue in safety-critical staff

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